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ASSET SALES AND DEBT CAPACITY 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we explore the link between asset sales end 
debt capacity.  Asset sales are a cormon way far firms to raise 
saab,  and so present an alternative to security issues for firms 
near financial distress.  We argue that liquid assets -- those 
tba  c  con be resold at attractive terms  -- are  good candidates for 
debt finance  because financial  distress  for fis with  such 
assets  relatively inexpensive.  We  apply this logic to explain 
variocion  in debt capacity across  industries  and over the 
bosiness  cycle, as well as to the rise in g.5. corporate  leverage 
in the 1980s. 
Andrei  Shleifer  Robert 91.  Vishny 
Harvard University  University of Chicago 
Cambridge, MA  t2l38  Chicago, IL  68637 1. Introduction. 
How do firms  choose  debt levels, and  why  do  firms  or even  whole  industries 
sometimes change how  much debt they  have?  Why, for example, have  American firms 
increased  their  leverage tremendously in  the  1980s  (Berrianke  and  Campbell  1988, 
Warshassky  1990), and why has this debt increase been  the greatest in some industries, 
such as  food and timber?  Despite substantial progress in research  on  leverage, these 
questions remain largely open.  In  this paper, we explore an approach to debt capacity 
based on  the cost of asset sales.  We argue that this approach helps understand the cross- 
sectional  determinants of leverage,  and also sheds light on the debt—increases of the 1980s. 
Asset sales are an effective  way in which firms can aenerate cash  fast, pay off some 
debt and reduce leverage. A lot of assets are sold by perfeutly  healthy  firms, which might 
need  cash to acquire other assets or to invest internally,  in the  1980s, many companies in 
very good shape sold divisions.  But asset saics are also used by firms in financial  trouble 
to raise  cash and  avoid default on their debt.  As the examples  of Texaco,  Pan Am and 
many LBOs illustrate, for highly leveraged  firms asset  sales are common both in and Out 
of bankruptcy. 
For  troubled  firms  selling  assets  is  an  alternative  to  conventional financial 
restructuring, such as debt rescheduling,  issuing equity to the public or obtaining fresh loans. 
Much research has shown  that these means of restructuring can be very costly to the firm. 2 
Rescheduling  debt creates free rider problems,  whereby bondholders hold out for a better 
deal  when  they think other bondholders are  agreeing  to a rescheduling.  Geriner and 
Scharfstein  (1990)  show that  these problems can be severe.  Issuing  equity has  the well 
known problem of buyer concern  that only overvalued firms issue equity.  As Myers (1984) 
shows,  this asymmetric information problem substantially  raises the  costs  of equity  issue. 
In addition, a pubiic equity issue preserves the control of possibly incompetent incumbents, 
which keeps down the prices investors  are willing to  pay.  Issuing  new debt  is often no 
easier than issuing equity,  because buyers of new debt are the last in line in claiming  the 
firm's cash  flow.  The costs of raising new money  to pay interest and fund necessary  capital 
etependitures  are thus often  prohibitive.  These costs of financial—restructuring  are well 
understood in the literature. 
Asset sales are a  form  of financial  restructuring that is often more attractive than 
the  approaches mentioned above.  Such a sale  can have  two  advantages over  a  public 
equity issue.  First,  the buyer of this equity claim can be  better informed  about  its  true 
value than a diffuse set of  outside shareholders  who buy the public equity  issue.  This would 
be  particularly  important if the buyer-is already in the  same industry as the assets being 
sold.  Second,  unlike  in a public equity sale the buyer  gains effective  control of the assets, 
and so can reduce  agency  costs by  for example replacing  the manager.  These  factors 
suggest that  asset sales  might be  an attractive alternative to the conventional financial 
restructuring. 3 
In fact, some legal scholars  have advocated automatic liquidation  of firms in financial 
distress, on the theory that such liquidation  allocates assets to the  highest  vaiue users and 
so is  cheap and efficient.  Financial economists,  in contrast, have typically  assumed  that 
liquidation is costly, and focused on traditional financial  restructuring without spelling out 
why selling  assets is more costly.  This  paper  focuses  on the cost of asset 50i05 to  gain 
greater insight into this alternative to conventional  financial restructunng.  By doing so, we 
describe this other aspect  of the costs of  financial  distress.  Since troobled firms presumably 
choose the cheapest way  of  dealing  with  distress,  we hope that  this  stody  will provide 
torther insight  into corporate debt capacity. 
T'ne cost of asset sales that we focus on is the lquiditv cost, defined as the difference 
oet-.een the net present value of an asset's  rash fioss in best ose and the price it fetches 
a quick sale.  Some assets, like commodities,  are extremely  liquid and can be easily sold 
fast at a price close  to value  in best use.  Other assets, such as tankers or  oil rigs might 
fetch very  low prices relative to value in best use when  sold  rapidly.  Part of the problem 
may be  the scarcity  of buyers who can use the asset; the asset may be non-fungible  and 
some buyers may be precluded from bidding by regulation such as antitrust.  Perhaps as 
important is the problem of costly credit to the buyers. At the time  an asset a sold  buyers 
from  the same industry are often themselves in financial trouble and so can pay only a 
fractton of the full value  of the asset in their use.  To  gauge  the cost of asset sales, we 
focus on the potential buyers:  their participation and ability to pay. 4 
Limited asset liquidity implies  that asset sales, like equity issues,  can be very costly 
to the firm.  The costs of  financial distress  are then high regardless of how the firm deals 
with  it.  This in turn implies that corporate debt capacity is limited,  and more so for firms 
with  illiquid assets. This result allows us to reinterpret some of the available evidence on 
cross-sectional  financing patterns and to generate some new predictions. 
Moreover, asset liquidity changes over time, as buyer participation and ability to pay 
changes.  As a consequence, debt capacity changes  over time, and in particular becomes 
very  high when assets are very  liquid.  We rely on changes in asset liquidity over time to 
etcplain why high markets tend to  be liquid markets,  why takeover waves  are  procyclical, 
and why increases  in leverage in the  1980s have  occured in some bt  not all industries. 
The next section sets out the  buyer' approach to the liquidity of assets.  Sections 
3 through  5 deal with the various types of potential buyers, and what limits the prices they 
pay  for assets,  Section 6  spells  Out  the relationship between asset liquidity and debt 
capacity.  Section 7 presents  the implications  of changes of liquidity over time, and section 
8 applies  the analysis to takeovers and leverage  increases in the 1980s. Section 9 concludes. 
2. Determinants of asset liquidity:  an overview. 
To  fix  ideas,  consider a  heavily  indebted farmer whose farm  is  not  currently 
generating a sufficient  cash  flow to cover both  his interest payments and necessary  capital 5 
expenditures.  Assume, as we do throughout this paper, that it is costly to this farmer to 
barrow more or to issue equity  in his farm.  The lenders are unsure about the quality of 
the farmer and his land, and suspect  that he is selling overvalued  securtties.  In addition, 
the farmer cannot get a new mortgage because it would be junior to his current one.  In 
this case, the farmer must sell all or a part of his farm to avoid turning it over to the bank. 
There are three distinct types of potential buyers of the land.  It can be sold to an 
outsider who would  convert it to a baseball field or some other use.  It could be sold to a 
neighbor who would  farm  it himself,  Finally, it could be sold to a New  York deep pocket 
nvestor who would  hire  the  current or some other farmer to farm the land, at least until 
he could tind a higher value buyer. This  list  of alternative buyers pretty much exhausts the 
relevant ct tor most assets.  We argue below that each of these buyers may be unwilling 
to pay the price equal to value in best use. 
Suppose  that  the  asset, namely  land, is converted to another  use,  such  as  the 
baseball field,  If the land is as valuable as a baseball field as it is as a farm,  this solution 
is very attractive in that the farmer gets a price close to the value in best use.  He would 
do especially well if several  people want to build  a baseball held on his farm,  and if they 
have  access to credit.  Fungible assets, such as  a farm  that can be  made into a popular 
baseball field, tend  to be  liquid.  But of course farms  and other  assets only rarely have 
alternative uses as good as the current use.  In this case, baseball promoters will not be the 
buyers. 6 
When the land is not funbie, the more likely high valuation buyer is one of the 
neighboring farmers.  These buyers have  the enormous  advantage of knong the quality 
of the land and perhaps  even the quality of the current farmer  The adverse selection 
problems that might plague outsiders interested in the farm are much less important for 
the neiehbors.  Moreover, the neighbors  can work the land themselves, thereby avoiding 
the agen problems resulting from hiring employees.  In fact, if the neighbors are actually 
allowed to bid for the farm  and if they have access to credit at attractive terms,  they are 
likely to buy the farm.  Tne competition between neighbors ensures a price close to value 
in best use, making the land very  liquid. 
The caveats of  participation and credit are very important, however. First, neighbors 
might  not be  allowed to bid because of government  limits on farm size (this is obviously 
more relevant for companies).  In  addition, unless  the farmer got in trouble for some 
idiosyncratic  reason such as  mismanagement, the neighbors are likely to  have  cash  flow 
problems of their own at  the time the farmer is distressed.  Because the  neighbors'  net 
worth is low as well, their cost of capital is high, and so they can bid much less for the farm 
than its fundamental value in their use.  The credit constraint problems of the buyers are 
the result of concern of the buyers' lenders that he is undertaking a bad project or has the 
wrong  incentives.  This  problem is particularly severe when the buyer's net worth, which 
determines the value of his collateral,  is low.  When  buyers cannot participate, or when they 
face credit constraints, the price realized from the sale of the land is below value in best 7 
use, making this land ilhiquid. 
In this case, the land would  probably  be sold to a deep pocket New  York investor 
who does not face as severe credit constraints as the farmer's neighbors.  Sale to such an 
investor has some of the same problems as simply swapping  equity for some of the esting 
debt.  The New  York investor must worry  about the quality of the farm, which he knows 
little about and so is afraid to overpay.  In addition,  the New York investor must hire either 
the current farmer or someone else to run the farm.  The agency  cost is a further burden 
on hfs purchase. Because of these adverse  selection  and moral hazard problems, the price 
that a deep pocket outsider will pay  for the  farm  will again  fall below value in best use. 
In this sale as well, the farm  is illiquid. 
The moral of the story is  that regardless  of whom  tim  farm is sold to, it is likely to 
bring a price below value  in best use. When the farmer dectied  on how much debt to take 
on, he  must have thought of these problems and restricted his borrowing. 
Table 1 summarizes  the taxonomy of buyers considered in this paper. The first type 
of buyer changes the use of the assets, the second and third do not.  The second type is 
industry  insiders,  defined as those with information about the quality of the asset and with 
the  ability  to mandge it.  The  third  type of buyers is industry  outsiders who nonetheless 
keep the asset in current use.  Such buyers  typically  Cannot easily evaluate the quality of 
an asset, and must hire a manager to run it.  To understand liquidity  of a given asset, we 
must understand how much a buyer of each of these types will pay relative to value in best Tabie  1 
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use.  If any one of the three types of buyers can afford to pay close to value in best use, 
a 
the asset is liquid.  If none of the three types can, the  asset  is  illiquid.  The next three 
sections will focus on these three types of buyers. 
3.  Asset  fungibility. 
Sale of an  asset brings a price close  to value in best usc when there are several 
participatIng  buyers to whom the asset is worth nearly its value in best use.  In some cases, 
the best use for an  asset is  different  from the current use.  For example, land can have 
many ditterent  things  built on  it;  a  building  may  be  easily converted from  one  use  to 
another; a car or truck can similarly be turned to another use; coal  and oil can be used as 
an input by a ariety if buyers.  Assets  which  have  severol  uses with  comparably  high 
valuations are called funtble,  Obviously,  most  physical capital is fairly specialized and is 
not very  fungible. 
Fungible  assets  tend to be fairly  liquid because they can be  transferred to another 
use if buyers in this asset's current industry cannot pay prices  close to value in best use2. 
This is particularly important when the whole industry in which the asset is currently used 
experiences an adverse shock, and so both  the fundamental value and the liquidity of the 
asset is higher elsewhere. For example, many industrial buildings  in downtown  New York 
2Even with  fungible  assets, there  may  be adverse selection  problems resulting from 
buyer uncertainty about the quality  of these assets. Such problems make the buyers more 
like  deep  pocket outsiders.  Nonetheless, holding adverse selection problems constant, 
iungibil;tv  raises liquidity. 9 
were converted to residential use when manufacturers left the city.  These buildings were 
liquid because they had an alternative use and so a seller did not need to dump them on 
industrial buyers who had low fundamental valuations and faced severe credit constraints. 
In contrast, non-fungibie  assets, such as oil tankers or machine tools, tend to be less liquid 
because  they cannot be  transferred  to  another  indust'  when the  indust'  they are 
employed in suffers  an advers shock. 
Fungibility  encompasses several characteristics of  assets that  other  studies have 
described as  conducive to debt  finance.  Titman and  Wessels (1988) argue that  asset 
uniqueness is bad  and  tangibility  is good for debt finance.  Their reason for focusing  on 
uniqueness and  tangibility  is not liquidity,  however.  They argue that firms with unique 
assets are poor candidates for debt finance  because customers cannot find substitutes for 
these finns' products,  and so insist that such firms avoid debt finance and the  resulting 
possibility of bankruptcy  before they rely on their products.  Titman and Wessels  also argue 
that tangible assets are good candidates for debt finance  because their value cannot easily 
be  dissipated by  management.  The moral hazard problems with debt  finance  of  these 
assets are less severe.  For this reason, land is a good candidate for debt finance. 
We would  argue that non-unique and tangible  assets are better candidates for debt 
finance  primarily because they tend to be more liquid.  Unique assets tend to be less liquid 
because by definition  they have  fewer potential uses and therefore fewer  buyers.  But even 
unique  assets can be liquid, and therefore have debt capacity, 'vhen they are traded by deep 10 
pocket investors  willing to pay prices  close to values.  For example,  some fashion  and food 
brand names, such as  Gucci or Moet-Chandon, are very  liquid because they have many 
interested buyers even  though all these buyers put them to the same use. These assets are 
good collateral largely because they can be easily resold despite  their unique use.  Even if 
art asset is  not very  fungible,  it can be liquid and  have  debt capacity  when  high  valuation 
buyers participate and have  money  to bid. 
Similarly,  the essential aspect of tangibility of some assets such as general  purpose 
buildings  is  that  they have  multiple  uses  and  buyers,  and so are  fairly  liquid.  Some 
specialized tangible  assets, such as oil rigs, might not be very liquid at all even  though they 
are quite durable  and  it  is difficult  for the  user to substantially  diminish  their value,  In 
contrast, some intangible assets, such as food brand names, have  been extremely  liquid in 
the  1980s  beaause of a  large number of interested potential buyers.  These assets' high 
debt capac.t derises from their easy salcability their  ntangibility  notwithstanding. 
Williamson  (198S) uses a concept of redeployability  that is close to fungibility.  He 
says that assets are good candidates for debt finance if they can be used elsewhere,  Debt 
is a hair-trigger mechanism which forces the redeployment of assets as soon as interest  is 
not paid or some covenant is violated.  Williamson  stresses that non-unique and tangible 
assets might be good candidates for debt finance because they are easily redeployable. 
Similarly,  Harris and Raviv  (1990) argue that debt levels will he set high  enough  to force 
managers to take value-enhancing liquidation  decisions.  When  the value  of assets in their 11 
current use falls below the value of  the debt, a costly reevaluation  is triggered. If  the firm's 
assets are found to be more valuable in other use, the firm is liquidated.  Ome implication 
of their theory is that leverage will be high where liquidation  value is high. 
These studies,  like ours, show that assets with several  alternative uses have  a higher 
debt capacity.  But fungibility  is  only one aspect of liquidity,  and  probably  not the  most 
important one.  As  we mentioned,  most physical  assets are not fungible,  and so putting 
them to alternative use is  impossible.  Buyers  of non-fungibie  assets must  keep them in 
current use.  In the next two sections, we examine  the liquidity of such assets.  In many 
cases,  they have  a high debt capacity  as well. 
4. Buyers  in the same industry. 
For most non-fungible  and  even  fungible  assets, the highest valuation buyers are 
those already  using similar assets in the same way.  In our earlier example, they are the 
next door farmers.  These buyers have two critical advantages over all others.  First, they 
can evaluate the assets most easily and so do not worry as much as others about overpaytng 
for low quality assets. Second,  they know how to manage these assets and so the agency 
costs that they must incur are the lowest.  For these reasons,  buyers  from the same industry 
tend to value these assets the most. Moreover, when  such buyers compete with each other, 
they will in many circumstances  pay close to the value  in best use for the assets. 
Indeed, the vast majority of  aslet sales are to such buyers.  Buildings are usually sold 12 
and bought by real estate developers, machine tools by manufactureres,  and companies  by 
a 
other companies in their industry.  As long as industry buyers are allowed to participate, 
and can afford to bid the value of assets under their management, assets tend to be liquid. 
The main reason for illiquidity of non-fungible  assets is participation and credit restrictions 
on industry buyers. 
Participation restrictions. 
Several factors  reduce participation  of  industry  buyers and so create illiquidity.  First, 
some markets are toni in that some buyers might not know about the asset being for sale, 
or might  oN show up.  Although  an asset would  be liquid if buyers are brought to bid, it 
is  illiquid occouse some  t them are not available.  Such ilL1uidity is important in housing 
markets.  where many potential buyers are not currently  in the market, or  in markets for 
smaller  urab1e goods.  where it  is  too  costly  to bring some  of the buyers to  the  sale. 
Thinness is unlikely to be important in the market tor companies, where the stakes are too 
large and the sale  too widely  publicized  for important buyers not to show up. 
In  many cases,  regulation is the reason that  industry  buyers do not participate, 
particularly in the  sales of companies.  For example, foreign buyers might  be  prevented 
from participating by protectionist laws.  As the case of United  Airlines  illustrates,  airlines 
j 
as a whole and individual routes are cheaper because foreigners cannot bid for the United 
States  airline assets.  The  same  is  true  about  assets  of  microchip  manufacturers. 13 
Conversely,  the United States takeover market has Probably become much more liquid in 
the  1980s as forei buyers in most industries have  been both  actively interested and free 
to participate. 
Antitrust has also been an important constraint on buyers,  particularly  before 1980, 
since it eliminated competitors  from bidding.  In the late 1960s, for example,  it was virtually 
impossible to sell assets to competitors because of aggressive antitrust enforcement. As a 
result,  many conglomerates were formed.  When  competitors are highest  valuation  buyers, 
as they most commonly are even when they do not plan to raise prices, keeping them out 
dramatically  reduces the liquidity of assets. 
Finally, even  when regulatory restrictions  do not prevent an acquisition  of assets by 
a firm in the same industry, there may be a problem of compatibility"  of  buyers and sellers. 
Not  every two  firms  in an industry are a good match;  Even when one can manage the 
other's assets, there may be a problem with control change  because of different corporate 
cultures,  difficulties  of keeping key people, and  problems of allocating  control rights  to 
managers and so on.  Especially  with intangible assets, where human capital is important, 
these participation restrictions further reduce asset liquidity. 
Credit Constroirits. 
The assumption that industry buyers can afford to pay the fundamental value of the 
asset under their ownership is  often invalid because these buyers are constrained in the 14 
capital market.  That is, it is costly for these buyers to raise external debt or equity capital 
for the exact same reason that such financing  is costly for asset sellers. The cost of funds 
to these buyers exceeds the appropriate risk-adjusted  discount rate for the asset, and so the 
asset is worth to them less than its fundamental value under their ownership. 
Buyers of some assets, such as very large companies. are likely to always be credit 
constrained.  No  buyer can purchase GM or IBM  with  internal funds or even  with a 
moderate amount of borrowing.  As a result, these assets are always illiquid.  This reasoning 
suggests  that smaller  assets are more liquid than larger assets, and that assets that can be 
broken up, such as conglomerates,  are more liquid than assets that cannot be, such as pure 
play firms of equal size. 
Eqlly impurtont.  ndostry  insiders  are likely to be credit constrained precisely  at 
the time when an asset used in  this industry  is put up for sale, since the whole industry is 
likely  to cc  adversely affected  at  the  same time.  Precisely  when the  seller is  credit 
constrained and  needs to  raise  funds,  potential buyers  tend  to be  credit constrained 
themselves and therefore have  lower  reservation values.  The reason for this, stressed by 
Greenwald et al (1984), Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Gertler and Hubbard (1988), Froot 
and Stein (1991) and others. is that when  buyers net worth  s low, lenders demand higher 
returns on the loans they make to control adverse selection dnd moral hazard problems. 
With industry or economy.wide shocks,  sellers and buyers of  assets are  in a symmetric 
situation: they both have  a lOW net worth and so both  have  a very  high  cost of external 15 
finance.  This problem makes asset sales to  industry buyers costly,  just  as  it  makes 
conventional financial restructuring costly. 
Consider a hypothetical  case of an airline (Eastern) that puts its gates, routes, and 
planes up for sale when it gets into  trouble.  One  possibility is that the adverse shock 
Eastern has experienced is idiosyncratic;  for example it has union problems.  In this case, 
Eastern puts its assets up for sale when other airlines are doing well, and so are not credit 
constrained, These firms can then bid their true reseriation values for the assets of Eastern 
and as long as these assets are fungible enough,  the auction will bring very attractive prices. 
In fact, if other airlines  can manage Eastern's assets better than Eastern, they  will bid more 
for them then their value under Eastern's management, and the costs of financial  distress 
will be negative.  In this  case, asset sales work very well  from the viewpoint of Eastern's 
creditors since not only do these creditors avoid the probletn of illiquidity but they also 
benefit from the reallocation of assets to higher valued use3. 
If, in contrast, that Eastern puts  its assets on the block at the  time that the  rest of 
the airline industry is in a downturn as well, perhaps as a result of an  oil price shock,  a 
recession or an overordering of planes. In this case, at the time Eastern's assets are on the 
block,  other airlines  have a very  high shadow price of funds, and so cannot afford to pay 
3Negative  costs  of  financial  distress  raise  the  obvious  question  of  why  the 
underperforming assets are  not sold even without financial  distress.  Clearly,  the  firm's 
managers  as opposed to its creditors and shareholders may be reluctant to give up personal 
control  of key assets unless  forced to.  Nonetheless,  managers acting in their own interest 
will be more inclined  to take on debt if a  reasonable number of asset sales can  extricate 
them from a control battle with creditors. 16 
their perfect capital market reservation  values. As the willingness to pay falls, the sale price 
also falls below the second highest valuation  absent credit constraints. In this ease, airline 
assets are iiiiquid. 
The point this example illustrates  is more  general.  A  firm  is  likely to run  into 
financial trouble when  its cash flow is low,  If the reason for low cash  flow is an industn'- 
wide or an economy-wide  shock, then the cash flows of other firms in the industty are also 
law and thetr cost of capital is hign.  Other  firms in the  industty  do not then value  the 
distressed firm's assets as  much  as they would  absent credit constraints. But these firms 
probably  have  the highest fundamental  volonnons  of the distressed  firm's assets, since they 
eon manoge them better than industcy  jotsiders and they ore not as worried  about adverse 
selection.  set sales  then  bring low prices relai',e t j ton I  mentais since the potentially 
highest  bidders have  a  high cost of funds. 
Severai factors  determine  the  liquidity  of  assets  wnen industiy  buyers are  credit 
constratned.  Most important, assets with  cyclical cash  flows, such as oil tankers and steel 
mills, are likely to  be  less liquid  in  recessions  than  assets with  non-cyclical  cash  flows. 
Cyclical assets are extremely illiquid during recessions,  when the cost of capital of industry 
buyers is high but are  liquid during  booms when it is  low. 
Similarly, the more distant are the cash  flows on an asset, the less liquid it is.  When 
S 
cash  flows  are discounted using interest rates  reflecting  credit constraints, the value of 
distant  cash  flows  is  reduced.  Growth assets are then discounted the  most  relative to 17 
fundamentals,  whereas assets with  high current and relatively  low  future cash  flows are 
discounted the least. 
Funbi1ity  of assets also raises liquidity when industry buyers face credit constraints 
beyond  its contribution with  unconstrained buyers.  When  its  industry experiences an 
adverse shock, a fungible  asset can be transferred to another industry.  Without credit 
constraints, it would only be  transferred if it can generate a higher fundamental value there. 
But with credit constraints, an asset can be sold to a firm in another industry  because that 
industry is not hit by an adverse shock and so is not facing credit constraints. By increasing 
the number of unconstrained buyers,  fungibility raises  liquidity. 
We conclude that the ability of  industry buyers to pay the fundamental value  of this 
industry's  assets in best use cannot be taken for granted.  Industry  buyers are often kept 
from bidding by regulation. In othe cases, industry buyers face severe credit constraints 
and so can oniy afford prices  that reflect this high cost of capital. The resulting  ihliquidity 
is particularly severe in recessions,  and for cyclical, growth and non-fungible assets. Selling 
such assets to industry  insiders  would  bring prices  much below values in best use. 
5.  Deep  pocket buyers. 
The third type of potential buyer for an asset is deep pocket investors.  These 
investors by definition  have  access to fairly  inexpensive capital because their other assets 
give them a high net worth that can be used as collateral. 18 
Purchases  by  deep  pocket  investors  are  in  some  ways  similar  to  financial 
restructuring such  as the  issue  of new equity.  Like buyers of equity  these investors  are 
likely  to  be  less capable of evaluating the  quality of the asset than mdustry  insiders.  In 
addition, deep pocket investors typically  need to hire a manager to manage the assets, 
which  entails agency  costs.  Unlike  equity buyers, however,  deep pocket  investors  gain 
control of the assets from the current managers, and so can design control mechanisms  to 
reduce these agency costs.  In particular, they cart fire the current manager. In this respect, 
purchases by deep pocket investors may be superior to equity issues.  Even so, the prices 
that  such investors pay  for the assets reflect the  adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems that theywill face  with  these  assets.  In  this case, assets sold to such investors 
fetch prices below values in best use. 
Access  to cheaper capital gives deep pocket buyers  an edge over industry insiders. 
On the other  hand,  their inferior knowledge  and ability to manage assets puts them at a 
disadvantage relative to industry insiders.  Presumably,  they acquire  the assets when these 
problems do not reduce valuation as much as the credit constraints of industry insiders do. 
This  is the case when the deep pocket investors  can learn to both evaluate and to manage 
the assets. Such deep pocket investors  can be in related tndustries,  so they can bring some 
of their knowledge  to bear on  the acquisition.  In addition, deep pockets investors might 
be attracted to assets which are in relatively stable industries  and so are relatively  easy to 
manage.  Chandler  (1990)  argues  that  such  assets  are  particularly  attractive  for 19 
conglomerate acquirers, who can be thought of as deep pocket investors. 
There are many examples  of deep pocket investors  who  have  to some extent 
overcome their informational  and managerial handicaps.  Cellular telephone properties are 
traded by phone companies,  who are deep pocket investors who understand these assets. 
As  a  result,  cellular telephone properties are  extremely  liquid even  though they are 
intangible growth assets.  The reason  is  that they can always  be  sold  to deep pocket 
telephone companies.  Similarly, food brand names, which are not fungible, have recently 
become very  liquid because they are traded by deep pocket tobacco companies  that have 
tried to solve some of the agency and adverse selection  problems that plague other deep 
pocket investors.  Finally, in our airline examples, leasing companies represent such deep 
pocket investors  who use detailed contracts designed  to avoid the need to dump planes on 
the market when airlines' cash  flow is low.  When deep pocket investors  manage to solve 
the information problems inherent in purchases of  assets outslde their industry,  they become 
an effective substitute for industry buyers and so greatly enhance the liquidity of assets. 
Such lucky outcomes are not  pervasive,  however.  In many cases, deep pocket 
investors  are the uninformed buyers  who  might  have  trouble valuing  and managing the 
assets.  In  these cases,  these buyers require deep  discounts  to buy the assets.  In  our 
example,  when Eastern's assets are put up for sale, the high bidders might be deep pocket 
investors  who have  a lower  fundamental valuation of assets as well  as a greater fear of 
overpaying  but also a lower shadow price of funds.  In fact, successful  buyers of  the assets 20 
need not even be the better managers;  just the ones with the deepest pockets.  Eventually, 
as liquidity improves, these buyers probably sell assets for a higher price to industry  insiders 
who cars  afford to bid their true valuations.  These buyers are thus  providing  temporary 
liquidity  in a highly illiquid  market4.  As long as the market for airline assets is  illiquid, 
sale prices are even  lower than the already  mw fundamental valuations. 
The  oil shipping business  provides  a  similar  example.  As cash  flows from that 
business  temporarily plummeted in the mid 1980s, and tankers sold for scrap value, astute 
investors  outside the industry stepped in and bought tankers, mothballing  them instead  of 
selling them for scrap.  Five years later, these investors  have made a 700 percent return on 
investment.  The oil shipping business is now less risky and has a lOgher debt capacity. 
These examples illustrate that assets might be  extremely llhiquid even  when  some 
deep pocket investors  are in the market.  When assets are not-fungible,  industry buyers are 
credit constrained, and outside deep pocket  investors are not informed, assets are extremely 
illiquid.  They cannot be sold for anywhere  near their fundamental value in best use, 
6. Asset liquidity  and debt capacity. 
Asset  illiquidity  becomes particularly  important for sellers  in  or  near  financial 
distress,  who face  the choice  between selling  assets and going through a costly  financial 
4Grossman and Miller (1988)  provide a theory of liquidity  in which liquidity suppliers 
temporarily hold  the  asse.t while higher valuation buyers are brought in to buy  it.  Their 
theory applies  to financial instruments which are vastly more liquid than the physical assets 
that we are concerned about. 21 
restructuring. Our analysis suggests that asset sales are not a panacea for a firm io financial 
distress,  unless  these assets arc extremely liquid.  Most assets however  arc oat liquid.  A 
distressed firm  must  then  choose between  costly  financial  restructuring, with  all the 
problems identified in the literature, and costly asset sales.  Either way, dissross  is costly. 
V/hen financial  distress  is costly, firms will choose their capitol  structure to reduce 
the  expected  value of these costs.  Having  more debt  in the capital structure raises the 
likelihood of default, and hence the need to either restructure or to sell  assets,  Because 
their sale is costly, illiquid  assets are poor candidates for debt finance,  and vice versa for 
liquid assets,  This  logic suggests  that asset liquidity  creates debt capacity  because liquid 
assets arc in effect better collateral. 
Asset illiquidity  might  help explain  relatively  low debt equity ratios io the United 
States.  Debt is significantly tax favored relative  to equity  in the United States even  after 
taking  account of personal taxes.  If  firms can sell  assets costlessly  whoa they become 
distressed,  the only reason for them to avoid nearly complete debt finance  is the managerial 
preference for independence.  If, however, firms have  to sell illiquid  assets when they are 
in  financial  difficulty,  or  choose  to sell  illiquid  assets to avoid expensive claimholder 
conflicts, debt avoidance  becomes in the interest of shareholders as well. 
It is hard to know how big the illiquidity costs of  distress are.  Real estate appraisers 
typically  assume that the rapid sale  of real estate  leads to price  discounts  of 15  to 25 
percent relative to the orderly sale that might  take several  months.  Kaplan (1989) cites 22 
Merrill Lyitch  estimates that the distressed sale of the Campeau retail empire would bring 
about 68 percent of  what an orderly sale would bring.  The New York Times reported that 
the rapid sale  discount on  the  Trump Shuttle  may be as much as 50 percent.  Holland 
(1989) Cites discounts of 50 to 70 percent off normal  prices  in a case study  of liquidation 
of assets of a machine tool  manufacturer,  Discounts of such magnitudes  can  drastically 
reduce or even eliminate the tax advantage of debt.  Asset illiquidity may be the  reason 
that firms use much less debt than is optimal in standard models. 
Although we have  taken  the shareholders' perspective on  optimal debt  levels, 
corporate managers also  have  selfish  reasons to  avoid  debt when the firm's assets are 
illiquid.  A firm's manager is typically intercsted  in tosintaining his control of the firm.  If 
a  firm with liquid assets runs  into cash  flow problems,  its  managers can sell  off some of 
these assets, pay down debt, and retain control.  If, on the other hand, the firm's assets are 
illiquid,  a manager cannot attractively  soil some of them to generate cash.  If he does not 
sell the assets and tries a conventional restructuring, he might lose  control.  If  he  sells 
illiquid  assets at too low a price and  pays down debt, he only worsens his future interest 
coverage problem and is likely to lose control  anyway.  It is clear that a manager committed 
to keeping control  of the  firm  will take on more debt when the  firm's  assets are more 
liquid, just like a manager maximizing shareholder wealth, 
In addition to suggesting  that debt capacity  is  mited, our approach has a variety of 
implications  for cross-sectional  financing patterns.  Liquid assets should be more extensively 23 
financed by debt.  We have  already mentioned that funble assets are liquid, because they 
have  many different  buyers and because some of these buyers are likely to hove relatively 
mild credit constraints. As a result,  fungible assets are better candidates for debt finance 
than non-fungible  assets. 
in contrast, groah and cyclical assets are iiiquid because industry  buyers  are likely 
to  have  a  high cost of funds when these assets are  distressed.  These assets are poor 
candidates fur debt finance,  unless  they  are commonly  traded by deep pocket investors. 
Oroah and cyclical assets are usually  considered to be  poor candidates for debt finance 
because they have  a high  probability of a low cash  flow and default on debt.  Bat even  an 
asset th a reasonable chance of default may have a high debt capacity if it coo be easily 
sold for fundamental value  when default occurs.  If, on the other hand, cyclical and growth 
assets are extremely  illiquid in a recession,  costs of  financial  distress are large, and financing 
these assets with debt is costly.  Airline  gates and routes, tankers and industrial  uquipment 
are poor candidates for debt finance  precisely  because industry buyers arc  themselves  in 
trouble in a recession, and so these assets are highly illiquid.  Illiquidity  is  an important 
reason for low debt capacity of cyclical and growth assets. 
Cyclical industries  might have an industry debt capacity  even when debt capacity of 
individual firms is not well-defined.  If other firms in the industry have  little debt, a given 
firm can afford to take on a lot of debt since it knows that in distress it can sell its assets 
without concessions  to other firms  who  have  significant  unused debt capacity.  On thc 24 
other hand, if other firms have substantial debt, a given firm's assets become much less 
liquid and so it is  much more costly for it to take on more debt itself.  There might  thus 
be an optimal debt level for the industry in which the benefits of debt are exactly offset by 
the  extra illiquidity  of the  industry  assets that  additional debt entails  This  notion of 
industry debt capacity is particularly  appraprtate for ndustries  with  industry-specific  assets, 
such as airlines.  Managers of American Airlines  and TWA  -- the  two remaining large 
airlines with a lot of  cash and unused debt capacity in 1990 -- have repeatedly said that they 
are waiting for the next crunch  in the industry to  pick up planes and routes from  all the 
other  firms  that have  taken on  a lot of debt.  With firm-specific  or fungible  assets,  the 
notion of industry debt capacay s not well-defined. 
Tne theory also  predicts that smaller firms arc  -etera parihus  better candidates for 
debt finance  than very  large  firms.  The caveat is important because small firms might be 
uninteresting to very  many buyers, since they are too specialized,  in which  case  the thin 
market reason for illiquidiry  might  be  more important than credit constraints of buyers. 
The way to test this prediction is to look at a market where firms of  different sizes operate 
together,  and  to see  if  smaller  ones  have  more  debt.  The theory also  predicts that 
conglomerates are better  candidates for debt finance  than  pure  plays  of the same  size 
because they can be  broken up into smaller  pieces  that are more liquid.  Similarly, any 
business consisting of a loose affiliatiua of different parts should have  a high degree of debt 
capacity.  For  example, a  company  whose  principal  assets  are  10  cable franchises in 25 
different cities has siiiflcant debt capacity. 
A further important implication  of the theory is that some assets have  debt capacity 
because they are traded by deep pocket investors though they would  not have  it if traded 
by industry  buyers.  For these assets, default is not very costly because they can he resold 
for a price close  to value  in best use.  For example,  cellular or cable TV properties have 
a high debt capacity because they are traded by deep pockets investors  such as telephone 
or media companies,  who have  access to cheap capital.  Similarly, art favored by many rich 
investors,  such as American  Fop art or impressionist  art, can be debt-financed  even  though 
it yields as  cash flow.  The a  main features of this art is first that mauy people like  it, 
and second that  these people  have  a  high  and persistent cash  flow.  The  nuraher of 
potential interested buyers is critical: American pop art has a liquid  market in the United 
States but no market in  Europe, whereas German Expressionist paintings  are  liquid  in 
Germany.  These examples  illustrate a  key  point:  it  is  not just  the  low  pruhubility  of 
financial distress  but the low liquidity  cost that creates debt capacity5. 
The empirical esidence of Titman and  Wessels  (1988) bears  on some  of  the 
predictions  of our approach, although the authors are motivated by ether theories. Titman 
and  Wessels  find  that firms with  unique  assets, where uniqueness is measured by  R&D 
5Mset  illiquidity  also has  implications  for the structure of corporate debt  and or 
corporate assets,  For example, firms with  illiquid assets are likely to cheese longer term 
debt (see Diamond 1991).  Firms would  also alter the composition  of their assets  toward 
more liquid  ones even at the  cost of operational efficiency,  to reduce the illiquidity costs 
discussed in this paper.  For example, restaurants might buy furniture and equipment with 
greater resale value to get more money  out in case they go bankrupt. 26 
intensity  and selling expenses, have  lower debt to equity  ratios.  They also find that firms 
with more  intangible assets  have  lower  debt equity  ratios.  Both of these  results  are 
consistent with asset non-fungibility  deterring debt finance.  Finally, Titman and Wessels 
find that smaller firms have higher debt equity ratios, also consistent  with our theory.  Most 
theories predict the opposite since smaller  firms have  higher transaction costs of external 
finance.  Overall,  the evidence  lends some support for the importance of  asset liquidity, but 
the tests  clearly were not designed  with  this theory in mind. 
7.  Changes in  liquidity over time, 
Our discussion  thus far  has focused on cross-sectional  variation in liquidity  and in 
debt  capacity.  We next focus art changes  in liquidity over  time.  Debt capacity is created 
not by today's liquidity,  but by liquidity  over some planning horizon during  which it might 
become necessary  to sell the asset.  An  asset  has debt capacity  during  the period the 
market is expected to be liquid, so should  the need arise  to sell the asset, the  discount  to 
fundamental value will be small. 
For most non-fungible  assets, the twa key determinants of liquidity are participation 
of industry and other informed buyers and  the cash  flow of these buyers.  Industry  buyer 
participation tends to be determined by laws and other major institutional changes,  and so 
is  highly  persistent.  Corporate  cash  flows  tend to be fairly persistent as well,  largely 
because the conditions in  an  industry and in the  economy  typically  change  fairly  slowly. 27 
Corporate cash reserves are probably  even  more persistent than cash  flows, since stocks 
change  less  rapidly than flows.  Because industry buyer participation and cash  flow are 
persistent, it seems reasonable to assume  that liquidity  is fairly persistent as  well.  if a 
market  is  liquid  today people probably expect  liquidity  to  persist  for a couple of years, 
during which  it might become  necessary  to sell the asset. Today's liquidity is then generally 
associated with today's debt capacity. 
Although liquidity  is persistent, it does change over time.  Changes in liquidity lead 
to  changes  in debt capacity.  High markets are generally believed to be liquid and low 
markets to be  ihiquid.  That is, fundamental values rise at the same time as prices  come 
closer to fundamental values.  Housing  markets and markets for companies illustrate this 
principle.  Below, we offer some reasons for the association between values and liquidity. 
Why high markets are liquid  markets. 
The most important reason that liquidity changes  over time, and that high liquidity 
goes together with  high  asset values, is  that  industry cash  flows  drive both  value and 
liquidity  and cash  flows  change over  time.  In  particular, industry cash  flows  change 
dramatically  over the business cycle.  When  industry ggs  cash  flows are high, their cost 
of capital is low since they can use internal funds to pay for the assets and can borrow on 
better terms.  a result, they can bid closer to their fundamental valuations  for the assets. 
Also,  fundamental values of assets rise with their o  cash flows.  In  part, this  is because 28 
current cash  Cows are part of the value, but also because there is a lot of persistence in 
cash  flow, so buyers extrapolate current cash flow lesels into the future. 
We see, then, that the fundamental value of an asset rises with  its own cash  flow, 
and its liquidity rises with its potential buyers' cash  flow.  When cash flows of  the asset and 
of its  potential buyers rise  at  the  same  time,  as  they would in an industry  or  general 
business upturn, both fundamental values and  liquidity risc.  In such  markets,  prices  are 
high both because fundamental values are high, and because prices assets fetch are closer 
to these values.  High markets are thus  liquid markets.  A lot of transactions often take 
place in such markets,  since sellers are willing to part with their assets at prices  close  to 
already high fundamental values esen without  financial distress.  In low markets,  in contrast, 
sellers get prices  below already  low fundamentals because assets are illiquid.  As a result, 
the  only transactions that take place are those where sellers have  to sell. 
In high markets, a firm can borrow more in anticipation  of being able to sell assets 
to other firms whose debt levels have  not risen despite increases  in their cash  flow and 
value.  As long as potential buyers hase not leveraged  up, a firm cancount  on unused debt 
capacity  of other firms to increase its own debt.  For example, buyers of real estate in a 
boom rely on debt finance  because they expect to be able to resell the buildings to others 
whose high cash flow can support greater debt,  Lenders see this  liquid resale market as 
well, and so lend on better terms.  When  so much new debt is  taken on that no unused 
debt capacity remains, the only factor that sustains liquidity iS self'fuifilling beliefs  of buyers 29 
that they can sell. Such self-fulfilling equilibria can b  very fragile, however, and cannot be 
sustained when liquidity  falls for an exogenous  reason, such as a scare in the junk bond 
market. 
Other than cash flow, the critical determinant of  both fundamental values and liquidity 
is the number of buyers. Changes in government regulation.  or in buyer tsstes, can bring 
new buyers into the market, particularly  from the same industry. If these are high valuation 
buyers,  this has The effect  of raising fundamental values.  The entry of new buyers also 
raises  the liquidity of the assets as the opportunities for selling assets to these buyers are 
created.  As liquidity rises, debt capacity  rises as well because of the possibility of rosciling 
to one of these new buyers. 
Self-fulfilling liquidi and debt capacity. 
In  our discussion  so far, we have  focused on exogenous changes,  such as those iii 
cash  flow  or in the number of buyers,  as  the reasons for increased liquidity  and debt 
capacity.  But to some extent, these processes are self-reinforcing.  When liquidity increases, 
by  definition  it becomes easier to  sell  assets at  prices  close  to  their values under best 
management. Someone who wants to buy a different asset from the one he owns can sell 
the asset for a good price and  buy  another  one.  Such buyers  would  avoid an illiquid 
market because they would  not be sure that they can sell their own assets on good terms. 
As such buyers enter the market, liquidity increases,  in this way, liquidity  is self-reinforcing, 30 
leading to muiriple equilibria without exogenous  shocks. 
This analysis might be germane to housing markets,  where people might try to buy 
houses only if they know that they can sell theirs on attractive terms.  So when a housing 
market is liquid, many people are willing to be buyers and sellers, reinforcing this liquidity. 
In contrast, when a market is illiquid, people do not become buyers because they can't sell 
their old house at a good price, and so the market stays ilhiquid.  In liquid markets, there 
are many transactions, high  prices,  and high debt capacity  because the resale market is 
good.  The reverse is true in illiquid markets.  Similarly, corporations might trade divisions 
to find best matches in liquid markets because they know they can sell poor matches, and 
abstain  from  trading  in illiquid  markets thus keeping them illiquid. 
There is an additional important feedback effect  from debt capacity  to liquidity. 
People borrow in  liquid  markets because resale is attractive.  But  resale is made mor 
attractive by the opportunity for those future buyers to borrow at attractive terms.  So good 
borrowing opportunities increase liquidity, which in turn improves borrowing  opportunities. 
In our real estate example,  buyers might choose debt finance precisely because they know 
that if they need to resell, other buyers would  have access to debt finance.  In this way, not 
only liquidity creates debt capacity, but debt capacity  creates liquidity. 
This feedback might be strong enough to generate multiple equilibria  as well.  In one 
equilibrium, assets are illiquid  and are not bought with debt because buyers  recognize  that 
other  buyers in  resale could not  themselves  borrow  at  attractive terms.  In  another 31 
equilibrium,  assets are liquid and buyers use debt to finance them because they expect they 
can resell  them to other buyers who will also  have  access  to debt at attractive terms, 
People can borrow solely  because others they trade with can borrow.  in principle,  these 
o  equilibria can coest holding constant both the number of potential buyers and  the 
cash  flow.  Liquidio and debt capacity can be self-fulfilling. 
All these arguments point in the same direction.  Some  of the time, asset markets 
are high and liquid, with  many transactions and substantial use of debt.  This  liquidity  may 
be self-sustaining,  but more likely it is helped by exogenous  increases  in cash flow or in the 
number of buyers.  At other times, markets are low and illiquid, with few transactions, and 
much less reliance on debt to finance  asset acquisitions. 
8. Takeover waves and leverage increases: the experience of the  1980s. 
Perhaps the most interesting application of our theoty is to the analysis of takeover 
waves.  set acquisitions  --  such  as  takeovers, selloffs  and divestitures --  are  highly 
pro'ciical (Golbe and White 1988),  This fact is surprising unless  one focuses on asset 
liquidity.  If assets sell for  their fundamental  values, and if capital markets are perfect, there 
should  be  no  cyclical  pattern  to  acquisitions.  If,  in addition, some firms are  sold  off 
involuntarily  when they are  in financial distress,  acquisitions  should be countereyclical.  In 
fact we observe the opposite. 
Asset liquidity  helps account for the evidence. In recessions,  many asset buyers are 32 
credit constrained and cannot afford to pay the fundamental values for the assets.  The 
sellers should then try to postpone the sale of assets until markets become more liquid. It 
is not so much that fundamental values are low when  cash  flows are low, but that prices 
are even  lower than fundamental values when cash  flows are low.  By comparison, when 
cash  flows are high, sellers can get prices close to fundamental  values since buyers are not 
credit constrained. Sellers should therefore be willing to part with their assets more readily. 
As a result, the volume of transactions is highly procyclical. 
High corporate cash  flows have  characterized every takeover wave in this century. 
In the 1980s, however,  an additional reason for increased liquidtty was the increase in the 
number of buyers. Before l986, the General Utilities doctrine combined  with accelerated 
depreciation provided  a tax reason tor  churning  assets.  In  addition, there  has  been an 
influx of foreign acquirers,  particularly  in food, chemical,  electronics  and financial  services 
industries.  Even more importantly, much of the  ncrease  in the takeover activity  in the 
1980s  was  in horizontal mergers owing  to  relaxation of antitrust enforcement (Bhagat, 
Shleifer,  and Vishny  1990).  Bhagat et al demonstrate that, once selloffs are accounted for, 
over 70 percent of the assets of targets of  hostile takeovers ended up in the hands of firms 
in the same industry  as these assets. 
The increase in the number and the cash flow of industry  buyers raised liquidity and 
debt capacity, since firms could more easily take on debt expecting  that they can sell assets 
and divisions at close to fundamental values if they cannot meet interest payments. In fact, 33 
many loans during this period were made with a clear understanding that cash  flow was 
insufficient  to pay interest from the beginning  and assets must he sold to pay do debt. 
Asset sales were not an unlikely contingency,  but a certainty  for these loans,  Asset liquidity 
was therefore essential for these loans to be made,  In this way, the liquid market for firms 
and disisions  made possible  large  increases  in bank debt and junk bond financing to the 
1980s (Bernanke and Campbell  1988, Warshawsky  1999). 
Some  of the  increases  in debt  were  part of the  takeover financing,  but  many 
compahics not  involved  in  takeovers also  increased  debt.  In  fact the  1980s  saw  an 
unprecedented increase in share repurchases by corporations, resulting in net retirements 
of equity  by the corporate sector as a whole (Bagwell and Shoven  1988).  Although  one 
reason for these leverage  increases may be takeover defense,  another reason  is the rtce in 
the  liquidity  of  assets,  which  greatly  increased debt capacity.  Quite  aside  from hostile 
takeovers, the liquid market for divisions enabled firms to take in more dcht.  ltttercctitigly, 
Seth (1990) reports that  debt  increases  have  been  particularly  pronounced in  cyciicai 
industries, in which liquidity  of assets rises sharply in economic  expansions. 
Many of the leveraged acquisitions  of the l980s, particularly  the LBOs,  would not 
have  been possible were it not for the liquid market for divisions.  This-  t•tcw active market 
for  large firms  and  their  didisions  --  spawned  in  part  by  the  relaxation of  antitrust 
enforcement and in part by financial innovation -- created the possibilities for debt finance 
conditional on  rapid resale of assets,  a practice essential  for LBOs.  Bhagat  et al  (1990) 34 
document that on average 30 percent of assets  were sold following a hostile takeover in the 
1980s; this average is 40 percent for LBOs.  Bustup takeovers is the extreme example of 
borrowing in anticipation of selling assets. Debt finance in anticipation  of a resale of  parts 
in a  liquid  market made the takeover wave of the  1980s so  large and so concentrated 
among the large companies. 
When companies  were not optimally managed, their assets could be sold at prices 
above their values as part of these companies.  In this case, the costs of financial distress 
were negative,  since assets could be liquidated for more than their status quo values. The 
increased liquidity of the market for assets raised division prices in divestitures  enough  that 
busting up mismanaged  conglomerates became profitable  when it was not profitble before. 
In this way, increased liquidity  might have made efficiency  improvements possible. 
The view that the liquidity in the market for corporate assets increased debt capacity 
contrasts with  the conventional view.  That view credits junk bonds and other financial 
innovations with increased takeovers since junk bonds  permitted the raiders to attack large 
companies.  Our view  is that the liquidity of the market for companies made junk bonds 
possible and not the other way around. First, takeover waves take place in many economic 
booms, and  many takeovers were financed  with debt before junk bonds were invented. 
Second, junk bonds did not  really become important until  1985,  several  years after  the 
takeover wave of the 1980s became big (Kaplan and Stein 1990).  This fact suggests  that 
taking  on junk debt  became attractive only after  the market for assets became  liquid 35 
enough.  Liquidity seems to have created debt capacity and not the other way around in 
the 1980s takeovers, although of course  there were important feedback effects as well. 
9. Conclusion. 
The starting point  of this  paper  is  that asset liquidity is  an  extrerneiy  important 
determinant of the costs of financial distress.  Among several  reasons for asset illiquidity 
we have identified are non-fungibiliny as well as regulation and credit coostraints  that reduce 
participation and ability to pay of the industry  buyers. Because assets of firms io fioanciai 
difficulty  are particularly illiquid  -- as their buyers are likely to be io fioaneiai difficulty 
themselves -- selling off  these assets might be very costly. The high dbocessions seilers must 
make if they sell off assets in illiquid markets reduce cx ante debt capacity since they raise 
the costs of financial  distress.  We have argued  that  this approach cao  be  used  to 
understand both cross-sectional  variation in leverage, and the changes in leverage over time. 
We have  not addressed the sudden end of the takeover wave of site  idStis, and in 
particular of  junk bond issues and LBOs.  Many of  the leveraged  buyouts and takeovers of 
the late  1980s were carried out on the expectation that the  liquidity of the market for 
divisions would persist. The persistent liquidity assured attractive asset sales and therefore 
made debt  financing  possible.  In  1989, asset liquidity  suddenly  declined.  Some of the 
causes  were exogenous, such as the forecasted recession,  the collapse of Drexel and the 
junk bond market, and the troubles of  some visible  LBOs such as Campeau and Southland. 36 
In  addition, investors, scared by the  few bad episodes, no longer expected markets for 
divisions to be liquid, which of course  meant that they no longer were. 
The troubles of the junk bond market meant that new LBOs could  not be easily 
financed  and old ones refinanced.  But even seasoned LBOs  that did not rely on further 
junk bond financing  ran into trouble  because their assets became ifliquid.  Many of these 
LBOs counted on asset sales to pay down  debt.  Asset illiquidity reduced proceeds from 
asset sales  below previously expected levels,  making  debt repayment mote difficult.  In 
addition, asset illiquidity further weakened the junk bond market, since investors  in junk 
bonds relied on asset sales for principal repayments. The troubles of  the junk bond market 
and declines in asset liquidLty  reinforced each other, stnce asset liquidity crucially depends 
on  financing,  and  financing  relics  art  liquidity.  Until the  liquidity  of corporate assets 
recovers, the troubles of many EBOs  are likely to continue. 37 
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